Emory Law Journal
Volume 61
Issue 4 The 2011 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium — Judging Politics: Judges as Political
Actors, Candidates, and Arbiters of the Political
2012

Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and
Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law
Richard L. Hasen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj

Recommended Citation
Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme
Court Justices Move the Law, 61 Emory L. J. 779 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol61/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

HASEN GALLEYS5

7/12/2012 3:36 PM

ANTICIPATORY OVERRULINGS, INVITATIONS, TIME
BOMBS, AND INADVERTENCE: HOW SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES MOVE THE LAW
Richard L. Hasen*
INTRODUCTION
Without doubt, the Supreme Court’s most prominent decision so far under
the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts has been Citizens United v. FEC.1
This 5–4 decision, striking down corporate campaign spending limits against a
First Amendment challenge2 and overruling two earlier Supreme Court
precedents,3 has been the subject not only of sustained academic commentary
and editorial criticism4 but also of controversial criticism from President
Obama in his 2010 State of the Union speech in the presence of a number of
Supreme Court Justices.5 Critics have condemned Citizens United as the
decision of an “activist” Supreme Court, while supporters have cheered the

* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to Bill Araiza,
Josh Douglas, Lee Epstein, Doug Laycock, Christopher Leslie, Rick Pildes, and Adam Winkler for useful
comments and suggestions.
1 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2 See id. at 886, 913.
3 Id.; accord McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
876; Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
876. The Court in Citizens United overruled one of the two major holdings of McConnell concerning spending
limits on certain corporate- and labor-union-funded election advertising. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
Challengers have now gone after the other major holding of McConnell, the portion of the case upholding the
party “soft-money” limitations of the 2002 McCain–Feingold law. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC
(RNC), 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 157 (D.D.C.), aff’d mem., 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010). Though RNC was a poor
vehicle for overturning McConnell, “[i]f the RNC refiles its case as a straightforward facial challenge to
McConnell’s soft money holding, I would be unsurprised i[f] the Court took the case and then either
overturned McConnell or whittled it away first, along the lines of [FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL
II)].” Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 621 n.262
(2011); see also infra text accompanying notes 36–40 (discussing Justice Alito’s stated desire for express
argument and full briefing before considering the overruling of precedent).
4 For articles on Citizens United, see Hasen, supra note 3, at 603–04 nn.173–77. My own views on the
case appear in Hasen, supra note 3; Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion
Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989 (2011) [hereinafter Hasen, Citizens United]; and Richard L. Hasen,
Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181 [hereinafter
Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance].
5 See Adam Liptak, A Justice Responds to Criticism from Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A17.
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Court for correcting earlier errant precedent in conflict with the First
Amendment.6
As Barry Friedman has pointed out in a recent Georgetown Law Journal
article, the Supreme Court does not always move the law in such a prominent
fashion.7 Despite the Citizens United ruling, and maybe now more because of
the public reaction to it, express overrulings of precedent are rare. The Roberts
Court also has engaged in “stealth overruling.” Stealth overruling occurs when
the Court does not explicitly overrule an existing precedent. Instead, it “fail[s]
to extend a precedent to the conclusion mandated by its rationale,” or it
“reduc[es] a precedent to nothing.”8 Using the example of the Roberts Court’s
treatment of Miranda v. Arizona,9 Friedman demonstrates how the Court has
been able to greatly reduce the precedential force of the Miranda case without
incurring public scrutiny and criticism.10 Friedman is critical of stealth
overruling on a number of grounds, most importantly because “stealth
overruling obscures the path of constitutional law from public view, allowing
the Court to alter constitutional meaning without public supervision.”11
I leave to others the question whether the Roberts Court empirically
engages in more (stealth) overruling than earlier groups of Supreme Court
Justices did and, even if the Roberts Court does so, whether a higher overruling
rate is grounds for condemnation.12 Instead, the more modest aim of this brief
Essay is to catalog additional tools that Supreme Court Justices can use beyond
express and stealth overruling to move the law. I also explain why Justices
might choose to use one, rather than another, of these tools to move the law.

6 Consider the recent heated debate between Floyd Abrams and Burt Neuborne in The Nation. Floyd
Abrams & Burt Neuborne, Debating Citizens United, NATION, Jan. 31, 2011, at 19.
7 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona),
99 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2010).
8 Id. at 12.
9 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10 Friedman, supra note 7, at 16–25.
11 Id. at 63.
12 The Roberts Court did not invent stealth overruling. For example, the Warren Court’s famous 1962
case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which held reapportionment claims to be justiciable under the
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, id. at 237, seems to be a stealth overruling of Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549 (1946), which held that such reapportionment claims are not justiciable under the Constitution’s
Guarantee Clause, id. at 556 (plurality opinion). I do note on the condemnation point that, if existing Supreme
Court precedent deviates more from the ideal point of the median Justice on the Roberts Court than precedent
deviated from the ideal point of the median Justice on earlier Courts, we could see more overruling now, even
if earlier groups of Justices were equally “activist” in terms of willingness to overturn precedent with which
they disagreed.
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In particular, I analyze four additional tools. “Anticipatory overruling”
occurs when the Court does not overrule precedent but suggests its intention to
do so in a future case. “Invitations” exist when one or more Justices invite (1)
litigants to argue for the overruling of precedent in future cases or (2) Congress
to overrule Supreme Court statutory precedent. “Time bombs” exist when
Justices include within a case subtle dicta or analysis not necessary to decide it
with an eye toward influencing how the Court will decide a future case.
“Inadvertence” occurs when the Court changes the law without consciously
attempting to do so, through attempts to restate existing law in line with the
writing Justice’s values.13
These tools demonstrate how Justices with a long time horizon and
patience sometimes can move the law both subtly (sometimes even
unconsciously) and forcefully. Part I describes these four tools, using
illustrations from Roberts Court cases, primarily in the election law and
remedies arenas. Part II briefly compares the costs and benefits of these tools
to each other and to express and stealth overruling, and notes that the tools
function to send signals to different audiences: lower courts, Congress, the
public, and other members of the Court.
I. FOUR (MORE) WAYS JUSTICES MOVE THE LAW
Whether one accepts the “attitudinal model” of Supreme Court Justices,14
there seems to be little question that, on occasion, Justices on the Supreme
Court wish to change existing law. Indeed, given the nearly complete freedom
the Supreme Court has in choosing cases to review,15 perhaps the most

13 As will become clear, inadvertence is not a conscious tool used by Justices the way these other tools
are used.
14 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
(1993). The attitudinal model says that the Supreme Court decides cases based on the “ideological attitudes
and values of the justices.” Id. at 65.
15 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 20 UTAH L. REV. 433, 446
(2011). A number of election law cases still make it to the Court on direct appeal through three-judge courts.
See id. at 455. When a case comes on appeal, the Court’s decision not to hear the case has precedential value,
unlike the system that applies for denials of discretionary writs of certiorari. See id. at 455–56. For this reason,
the Court is more likely to grant hearings from direct appeals. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 36–38 (2003) (discussing the
reasons the Supreme Court’s poll tax case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), was
decided through a full opinion and not through a summary affirmance and dissent). For background on the
direct-appeal process, see Douglas, supra, at 14–18, 23–25; Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District
Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 132 (1996).
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common reason that a Justice will vote to hear a case will be to make some
change in existing law.16
The strongest and most definitive way for Supreme Court Justices to move
the law is through express, direct action: expressly overruling or extending
precedent. But there are at least four reasons why such express action may be
unavailable or undesirable in a particular case: (1) no majority of Justices may
be willing to move the law in a particular direction; (2) express overruling or
extension of precedent might lead to fractious 5–4 decisions, which Justices
might wish to avoid for reasons of collegiality or otherwise; (3) jurisdictional
or prudential concerns may lead the Court to decline to expressly overrule or
extend precedent; or (4) Justices may fear public opinion or retaliation by the
political branches.17 Accordingly, Justices might sometimes look to move the
law in other, less direct ways.
A. Anticipatory Overruling
Though Citizens United is thus far the most famous case of the Roberts
Court, it was almost the second most famous case.18 The public is scarcely
aware of it, but in 2009 the Supreme Court in Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO) came very close to
overturning a key portion of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), widely considered
a crown jewel of the civil rights movement, and overruling earlier cases going
back to 1966 that upheld the Act’s constitutionality.19 The portion of the VRA
at issue, section 5, requires jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination
in voting to seek permission, or preclearance, from the Department of Justice

16 Supreme Court Rule 10 provides a nonexhaustive list of reasons for the Court’s use of a discretionary
grant of a writ of certiorari to review a lower court case. See SUP. CT. R. 10. The rule lists the following
reasons to grant certiorari: (1) conflicts among lower courts on a controlling legal question, (2) a lower court
so straying from existing law that the Court’s role as a supervisory court comes into play, and (3) a lower court
deciding an important federal question that has not been decided by the Supreme Court. See id. Each of these
is an occasion for the Court to change the law. See id. The rule concludes: “A petition for a writ of certiorari is
rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law.” Id. Here and throughout this discussion, I leave aside the scenario in which the Justices
decide cases truly of first impression, where there is no precedent to extend or reverse.
17 On the extent to which courts respond to majoritarian pressures, see Friedman, supra note 7, at 33; and
Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103.
18 Then again, given path dependency, perhaps the Court in Citizens United would not have expressly
overturned precedent had it first faced a severely negative public reaction from an earlier decision striking
down the Voting Rights Act (VRA).
19 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009).
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or a D.C. court before making any changes in voting rules.20 The claim made
in NAMUDNO was that the preclearance requirement exceeded congressional
powers given the lack of contemporary evidence of discrimination by the
covered jurisdictions.21
A decision striking down section 5 would have had huge symbolic
significance, likely evoking an even greater negative public reaction than the
reaction to Citizens United. But instead of overruling the precedent and
striking down the VRA, the Court engaged in a tortured statutory analysis to
avoid doing so, all the while signaling that it would not be so charitable when
reviewing the constitutional question in the next case.22 NAMUDNO, therefore,
was a case of anticipatory overruling. Anticipatory overruling occurs when the
Court does not overrule precedent but suggests its intention to do so in a future
case.
In a surprising and relatively short opinion, the Court, in an 8–1 vote,
decided NAMUDNO on statutory grounds, ruling that the utility district was
entitled to “bail out” from coverage under the VRA, despite clear text and
legislative history indicating that only jurisdictions that register voters (which
the utility district did not do) were entitled to bail out.23 The Court’s opinion,
written by Chief Justice Roberts, engaged in a detailed exposition of the
serious constitutional questions raised by the case.24 The Court noted that
“[t]he Act . . . differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition
that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”25 It said a departure from this
principle “requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”26 It flagged the federalism
concerns and noted the danger that “[t]he evil that § 5 is meant to address may
no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”27
After noting that the coverage formula (as to which jurisdictions are covered
by a preclearance requirement) is thirty-five years old and possibly outdated,
the Court noted that “Congress heard warnings from supporters of extending
20 See id. at 2509 (construing Voting Rights Act of 1965 §§ 4, 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a)
(2006)).
21 See id. at 2510.
22 See Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 4, at 220–21 (discussing the Court’s decision in great
detail).
23 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516.
24 See id. at 2513–16.
25 Id. at 2512 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)).
26 Id.
27 Id.
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§ 5 that the evidence in the record did not address ‘systematic differences
between the covered and the non-covered areas of the United States.”28
Following this discussion and raising serious doubts about section 5’s
constitutionality, the opinion stated, “[W]e are keenly mindful of our
institutional role. We fully appreciate that judging the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress is ‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called
on to perform.’”29 The Court then offered a superficial textual analysis of the
bailout question, concluding, without any reasonable basis, that the utility
district was entitled to bail out,30 thereby avoiding striking down the VRA and
overruling earlier precedent.31 At the end of the day, the Supreme Court in
NAMUDNO let section 5 of the VRA stand, while signaling strongly that next
time around section 5 would not survive constitutional scrutiny in its current
form.
The Court’s use of anticipatory overruling is notable not only for its
expansive use of the constitutional-avoidance doctrine to avoid a controversial
decision but also for its subtle signaling of unconstitutionality, which contrasts
with the Court’s more explicit past use of anticipatory overrulings.32 For
example, in the 1982 case of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., the Court held that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was
unconstitutional because it conferred Article III judicial powers on non-Article
III bankruptcy judges.33 But the Court stayed its own ruling to give Congress
“an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid
means of adjudication, without impairing the interim administration of
bankruptcy laws.”34 In more recent years, given the direction of the Court’s
retroactivity jurisprudence, the Court has backed off such express anticipatory
overrulings.

28 Id. (quoting The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 10 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional
Law, New York University School of Law)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
29 Id. at 2513 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)).
30 Id. at 2513–14; accord Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 4, at 204–06.
31 Though the Court could have said it was merely distinguishing earlier cases holding that Congress
acted within its powers in passing the preclearance provisions of the VRA, the public likely would not
understand the distinction and view a decision striking down the VRA as an overruling of precedent.
32 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 651–63 (4th ed.
2007).
33 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion).
34 Id. at 88; accord ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 32, at 653–54.
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B. Invitations
Invitations exist when one or more Justices invite (1) litigants to argue for
the overruling or extension of precedent in future cases or (2) Congress to
overrule Supreme Court statutory precedent. Here I briefly describe the
Roberts Court cases in each category.
In 2007, before Citizens United, the Supreme Court decided FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II).35 Like Citizens United, WRTL II
raised questions about the constitutionality of limits on corporate spending in
elections.36 I have described the complex facts of the case elsewhere.37 Here, it
is enough to note that the Court held that a McCain–Feingold provision
limiting corporate-funded, election-related television ads could not be applied
to an ad mentioning U.S. Senate candidate Russ Feingold and his position on
the filibustering of judicial nominees.38 Notably, the Court produced no
majority opinion. In a concurrence joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
Justice Scalia took the position that the challenged provision was
unconstitutional as applied to any corporate spending.39 Justice Scalia
contended that McConnell and Austin should be overruled,40 a position the
Court adopted three years later in Citizens United.41
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a narrower (and
therefore controlling) opinion that did not reach the question of whether
McConnell and Austin should be overruled.42 He instead concluded that the
only corporate-funded advertisements that the law could bar constitutionally
were those that were the “functional equivalent of express advocacy,” and he
read “functional equivalency” very narrowly.43 Applying this new test, the

35

551 U.S. 449 (2007).
Id. at 457.
37 See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1076–80 (2008).
38 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 476 (plurality opinion); id. at 503–04 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (construing Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§ 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006))).
39 See id. at 492–93.
40 See id. at 490, 499–504.
41 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
42 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 476, 480–81 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia was quite critical of the limited
nature of the controlling opinion, stating, “This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.” Id. at 499 n.7
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Professor Friedman criticized the controlling
opinion as an example of stealth overruling. Friedman, supra note 7, at 11–12.
43 See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 455–82 (plurality opinion).
36
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controlling opinion held that the ad was not the “functional equivalent” of
express advocacy against Senator Feingold: it did not mention Senator
Feingold’s character or fitness for office and had no other clear indicia of the
functional equivalent of express advocacy.44
Despite joining the Chief Justice’s controlling opinion, Justice Alito also
issued a separate single-paragraph concurrence:
I join the principal opinion because I conclude (1) that § 203 of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, as applied, cannot
constitutionally ban any advertisement that may reasonably be
interpreted as anything other than an appeal to vote for or against a
candidate, (2) that the ads at issue here may reasonably be interpreted
as something other than such an appeal, and (3) that because § 203 is
unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements before us, it is
unnecessary to go further and decide whether § 203 is
unconstitutional on its face. If it turns out that the implementation of
the as-applied standard set out in the principal opinion impermissibly
chills political speech, we will presumably be asked in a future case
to reconsider the holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n,
45
that § 203 is facially constitutional.

Note that Justice Alito went out of his way to flag something everyone
already knows: the courts are always open to an argument that old precedent
should be overruled. But by emphasizing the fact that “presumably” an
individual chilled by the Court’s ruling would argue for overruling McConnell
in a future case, he appeared to invite litigants to raise such a challenge.
Bill Araiza flags a similar, if subtler, example of Chief Justice Roberts’s
use of an invitation in a recent Sixth Amendment case.46 In Rothgery v.
Gillespie County, the Chief Justice joined Justice Souter’s majority opinion,
but then separately described Justice Thomas’s dissent as “compelling,”
concluding that “[a] sufficient case has not been made for revisiting those
precedents, and accordingly I join in the Court’s opinion.”47 A careful reader
would understand the Chief Justice to be inviting someone to make a forthright

44

Id. at 470, 480–81.
Id. at 482–83 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
46 See William D. Araiza, Playing Well with Others—but Still Winning: Chief Justice Roberts, Precedent,
and the Possibilities of a Multi-Member Court 4–6 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Papers
Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 220, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1758001.
47 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
45
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attack on those precedents in a future case.48 If not, what would be the point of
the separate concurrence?
Despite Justice Alito’s invitation in WRTL II, he also has consistently
expressed the belief that courts should overrule precedent only when there is
an explicit request, full briefing, and oral argument on the question. In Randall
v. Sorrell, a case challenging a number of Vermont’s campaign finance laws,
Justice Alito again filed a very short concurrence to a controlling (nonmajority)
opinion.49 There, he noted that a party arguing for the overruling of a portion
of Buckley v. Valeo50 had made the overruling argument only briefly in its
ninety-nine pages of briefing.51 He concluded that “[w]hether or not a case can
be made for reexamining Buckley in whole or in part, what matters is that
respondents do not do so here, and so I think it unnecessary to reach the
issue.”52
Justice Alito made a similar point in his majority opinion last term in NASA
v. Nelson.53 There, the Court declined to decide whether the Constitution
contains a right to “informational privacy.”54 Instead, the Court assumed the
right existed for the sake of argument and then held that the right, if it existed,
was not violated in this particular case. Over Justice Scalia’s strong
concurrence urging that the Court decide the constitutional question,55 Justice
Alito responded that “[i]t is undesirable for us to decide a matter of this
importance in a case in which we do not have the benefit of briefing by the
parties and in which potential amici had little notice that the matter might be
decided.”56
Justice Alito’s desire to invite full briefing when overruling precedent is a
possibility was likely on display in Citizens United itself. The Court first
deferred deciding the case after it was argued in March 2009. Instead, the
Court issued an order in June 2009 setting the case for supplemental briefing
and reargument on the express question of whether Austin and McConnell

48 See Araiza, supra note 46, at 6 (“[The Chief Justice’s] strategy invites future litigants to suggest
cabining that precedent, thus isolating and ultimately undermining it.”).
49 548 U.S. 230, 263–64 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
50 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
51 Randall, 548 U.S. at 264 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
52 Id.
53 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
54 Id.at 756–57.
55 Id. at 767–69 (Scalia, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 756 n.10 (majority opinion).

HASEN GALLEYS5

788

7/12/2012 3:36 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:779

should be overruled.57 The Court ultimately overruled those cases in an
opinion issued in January 2010.
While Justice Alito seems to be inviting litigants to argue forthrightly for
the overruling of precedent when appropriate, Justice Ginsburg has directed
her invitations to Congress. In a recent lecture on the value of dissenting
opinions, Justice Ginsburg discussed the Court’s 2007 decision in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,58 noting that “[a]nother genre of dissent aims to
attract immediate public attention and, thereby, to propel legislative change.”59
In Ledbetter, the plaintiff, Lilly Ledbetter, filed an action under Title VII
alleging pay discrepancies because of her sex.60 Justice Ginsburg commented:
A fit example, perhaps, is the dissent I summarized from the bench in
2007 in Lilly Ledbetter’s case. Ledbetter worked as an area manager
at a Goodyear tire plant in Alabama; in 1997, she was the only
woman Goodyear employed in such a post. Her starting salary (in
1979) was in line with the salaries of men performing similar work.
But over time, her pay slipped. By the end of 1997, there was a
fifteen to forty percent disparity between Ledbetter’s pay and the
salaries of her fifteen male counterparts. A federal jury found it
“more likely than not that [Goodyear] paid [Ledbetter] a[n] unequal
salary because of her sex.” The Supreme Court nullified that verdict,
holding that Ledbetter filed her claim too late.
It was incumbent on Ledbetter, the Court said, to file charges of
discrimination each time Goodyear failed to increase her salary
commensurate with the salaries of her male peers. Any annual pay
decision not contested promptly (within 180 days), the Court ruled,
became grandfathered, beyond the province of Title VII (our
principal law prohibiting employment discrimination) ever to repair.
The Court’s ruling, I observed for the four dissenters, ignored
real-world employment practices that Title VII was meant to govern:
“Sue early on,” the majority counseled, when it is uncertain whether
discrimination accounts for the pay disparity you are beginning to
experience, and when you may not know that men are receiving more

57 See Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009). For the procedural history of the case, see Hasen,
Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 4, at 182, 206–13. Justice Alito’s attitude likely explains why he and
Chief Justice Roberts did not join Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in voting to hear the challenge to the
soft-money provisions of McCain–Feingold. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 621 n.262.
58 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
59 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010).
60 See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621–22.
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for the same work. (Of course, you would likely lose such a
premature, less-than-fully-baked challenge.) If you sue only when the
pay disparity becomes steady and large enough to enable you to
mount a winnable case, you will be cut off at the Court’s threshold
for suing too late. That situation, I urged, could not be what Congress
intended when, in Title VII, it outlawed discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in our Nation’s workplaces.
“[T]he ball is in Congress’[s] court,” I wrote, “to correct [the
Supreme] Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”
Congress responded within days of the Court’s decision. Bills
were introduced in the House and Senate to amend Title VII to make
it plain that each paycheck a woman in Ledbetter’s situation received
renewed the discrimination and restarted the time within which suit
could be brought. Early in 2009, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act, and President Obama signed the corrective measure as
61
one of his first actions after taking office.

Justice Ginsburg’s invitation in Ledbetter was clear to Congress. If
Congress believed the Court got the statute wrong, “the ball [wa]s in
Congress’[s] court.”62 And Congress took the ball and ran with it.
C. Time Bombs
Justices are sometimes more subtle than they are with invitations. I became
familiar with the “time bombs” concept from Seth Stern and Steve Wermiel’s
fascinating 2010 biography of Justice Brennan.63 Discussing Justice
O’Connor’s reluctance to join one of Justice Brennan’s opinions, the authors
wrote, “O’Connor had taken to heart [Justice] Powell’s warnings that Brennan
planted ‘time bombs’ in his opinions. She had learned to watch for those
seemingly offhand, throwaway phrases that he exploited in later cases.”64
Unlike anticipatory overrulings and invitations, time bombs are more
difficult to detect. How is one to know whether a Justice (or her clerk) has
61 Ginsburg, supra note 59, at 6–7 (first, second, third, fourth, and sixth alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted).
62 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63 SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010).
64 Id. at 493. I do not deal here with a different type of “time bomb” where a Court majority uses very
broad language to decide a narrow, relatively unimportant issue, leaving open the possibility of applying that
broad language more radically in an important future case. Arguably that description applies to the Court’s 5–4
decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). See
Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary Executive Branch
Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010).
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consciously planted something for a future case? Alternatively, how is one to
know whether a statement, citation, or dictum is merely inadvertent? There
will rarely be a smoking gun, not even in a Justice’s files that are released
years after a decision, indicating a Justice’s intentions, and therefore, one
needs to go on suspicions.
Consider, for example, a recent controversy over an obscure see citation in
a 2008 campaign-finance case and its relevance to a recently decided Supreme
Court decision. In Davis v. FEC,65 the Supreme Court, relying on Buckley’s
rejection of the equality rationale for campaign-finance spending limits,66
struck down a provision of the McCain–Feingold campaign-finance law giving
U.S. House candidates the right to collect increased individual contributions
for their campaigns when they faced a self-financed opponent spending large
sums.67
The controversy stemmed from the following passage in Alito’s majority
opinion in Davis:
Section 319(a) requires a candidate to choose between the First
Amendment right to engage in unfettered political speech and
subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations. Many candidates
who can afford to make large personal expenditures to support their
campaigns may choose to do so despite § 319(a), but they must
shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if they make that
choice. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359–1360 (CA8 1994)
(concluding that a Minnesota law that increased a candidate’s
expenditure limits and eligibility for public funds based on
independent expenditures against her candidacy burdened the speech
of those making the independent expenditures); Brief for Appellee 29
(conceding that “[§]319 does impose some consequences on a
68
candidate’s choice to self-finance beyond certain amounts”).

In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of an Arizona public-financing law that
gave participating candidates the right to additional public funding when
facing large spending from a nonparticipating opponent or an independent
expenditure effort.69 The Ninth Circuit had held that Arizona’s matching-fund

65
66
67
68
69

128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976) (per curiam).
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774.
Id. at 2771–72 (alteration in original).
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).
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provision did not violate the First Amendment under Davis.70 The Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion71 was contrary to the Eighth Circuit Day v. Holahan
case72 cited by the Supreme Court in Davis.73
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, striking down the
Arizona extra-matching-funds provision. In so doing, the Court not only cited
Day once again but also referenced the fact that the Court had earlier cited Day
in Davis for the proposition that these matching systems raise constitutional
problems:
[S]ee also Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (C.A.8 1994) (it is
“clear” that matching funds provisions infringe on “protected speech
because of the chilling effect” they have “on the political speech of
the person or group making the [triggering] expenditure” (cited in
Davis, supra, at 739, 128 S.Ct. 2759)). The dissent’s disagreement is
74
little more than disagreement with Davis.

As presented in Bennett, the Court had all but resolved this issue in Davis
and signaled that resolution through its citation to Day.
Intentionality is the remaining question. Was Justice Alito planting a time
bomb so that the Court could later refer back to this citation from Davis as
support for a ruling in Bennett striking down the Arizona matching-fund
system? While we likely will never know his true intentions, it is certainly
possible that this was what Justice Alito or a clerk had in mind in including the
reference to the Day case in Davis.75

70

McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. 2806.
See id. at 523 n.9 (stating that the citation of Day in Davis was for a limited proposition and did not
create a precedent).
72 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
73 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.
74 Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2824 (second alteration in original).
75 Here is another recent example of a possible time bomb. The Supreme Court decided Washington State
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008), while a controversial voter-identification
case was pending before the Court. Rick L. Hasen, About Face: The Roberts Court Sets the Stage for
Shrinking Voting Rights, Putting Poor and Minority Voters Especially in Danger, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20080326_hasen.html. A key holding of Washington State Grange
was that courts should favor as-applied over facial challenges in election law cases. See Wash. State Grange,
552 U.S. at 458. When the case was decided, I suggested that Chief Justice Roberts “may be looking further
ahead, to one of the most controversial cases of the term: Crawford v. Marion County, the Indiana voter
identification law case. . . . The rule the Court has laid down now may not bode well for the Indiana voter ID
law challengers.” Hasen, supra. Sure enough, in Crawford, the Court relied upon Washington State Grange in
applying the rules as to as-applied challenges. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621–
22 (2008) (plurality opinion).
71
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D. Inadvertence
Inadvertence occurs when the Court changes the law without consciously
attempting to do so, through attempts to restate existing law in line with the
writing Justice’s values. Of course, it is possible that some of these
misstatements of the law are intentional—either on the part of a Justice or
Justices, or a clerk—as a surreptitious means of shifting the law without
alerting the other Justices of the shift.76 But the issue of such devious
motivation is very difficult to prove,77 and it is enough for my purposes to treat
all cases of legal misstatements as those of inadvertence.
Consider the Supreme Court’s recent treatment of the standards for issuing
permanent injunctions. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., the Supreme
Court reversed a “‘general rule,’ [of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit] unique to patent disputes, ‘that a permanent injunction will
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.’”78 Unremarkably,
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that the question of
the issuance of a permanent injunction must be judged on a case-by-case basis
through the application of judicial discretion.79 It rejected the Federal Circuit’s
special rule for patent injunctions.80 The surprise in the case came in the
Court’s statement of the “well-established principles” applicable to the
issuance of permanent injunctions:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a
court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it
has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of

76 Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 670 (1979) (“It reads as though the Court were unaware of any case after Douglas, but the
Court could have deliberately created that impression.”).
77 See id. at 669–79 (providing detailed analysis to determine possible Supreme Court Justices’
motivations in ignoring relevant precedent in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and concluding that
the reason for ignoring precedent was likely inadvertence).
78 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
79 See id. at 391.
80 See id. at 393–94.

HASEN GALLEYS5

2012]

7/12/2012 3:36 PM

HOW SUPREME COURT JUSTICES MOVE THE LAW

793

equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for
81
abuse of discretion.

A major problem with the Supreme Court’s recitation of this supposedly
“well-established” four-part test is that the test did not exist before. Professor
Doug Rendleman explained that “[r]emedies specialists had never heard of the
four-point test.”82 There was a familiar four-part test for the issuance of
preliminary injunctions, but it was not this same test.83 The test for preliminary
injunctions, which looks in part at future likelihood of success on the merits,
“make[s] no sense as applied to permanent injunctions.”84
So how did this new test come into being in eBay? Professor Laycock
explains what appears to be Justice Thomas’s inadvertence:
EBay and many of its amici, and the U.S. Solicitor General, who
was supporting MercExchange, all referred to some version of four
traditional considerations relevant to injunctive relief. They did not
all cite the same four factors, and none of the lead briefs offered
anything so flat footed as the Court’s formulation. The Court appears
to have mostly taken its four-part test from the district court, which
took it from one earlier district court opinion; putting irreparable
injury in the past tense appears to have been an innovation by Justice
Thomas or one of his clerks. And because the opinion gives no hint
how any of the four parts of the test apply to the facts of the case, its
abstract pronouncement has no real content. The case was litigated by
an all-star cast of Supreme Court lawyers, but none of them consulted
85
a remedies specialist.

But Court inadvertence takes on a life of its own.86 The eBay test has now
been cited and applied by numerous lower courts,87 and the Court recently
reaffirmed it as the “traditional four-factor test” last term in Monsanto Co. v.

81

Id. at 391 (citations omitted).
Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV.
LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007); accord DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 273 (8th ed. 2011).
83 Rendleman, supra note 82, at 76 n.71.
84 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 426 (4th ed. 2010)
(emphasis added). The test also suffers from other problems, such as that the first and second elements appear
to be asking the same question. Id. at 426–27.
85 Id. at 427.
86 See id. (“There was no such test before, but there is now.”).
87 See id. (“By early May 2010, eBay had been cited more than 4,100 times.”).
82
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Geertson Seed Farms.88 “And once again the Court appeared oblivious to any
difference between permanent and preliminary injunctions.”89
In the eBay and Monsanto cases, the law moved significantly through
apparent inadvertence. The term “inadvertence” might suggest some
randomness, but I expect inadvertent mistakes to more systematically reflect
the value judgments of the Justice drafting the opinion. The causal mechanism
for such a bias is straightforward: an error in stating existing law (or
inadvertent change of law) in a draft opinion is less likely to capture the
attention of a Justice reviewing a draft opinion if the error is in line with what
the Justice expects the law to be.
The eBay case provides a nice example of the nonrandomness of
inadvertence. In applying the (new) four-part test, the Court’s analysis in
Monsanto increased the burdens on plaintiffs seeking permanent injunctions.90
Before eBay, the common understanding was that it was up to a defendant to
raise the question of the public interest as a kind of affirmative defense if the
defendant believed the injunction sought by the plaintiff did not serve the
public interest.91 Under the new test, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the public interest “would not be disserved” by a permanent injunction.92
As Professor Laycock asks: “Might this mean that benefits to the public
interest cannot count in favor of issuing the injunction, but that harm to the
public interest is an absolute reason not to issue it? Did Justice Thomas choose
that phrasing deliberately in eBay, or might it be inadvertent?”93 Whatever
Justice Thomas intended, he has certainly written or signed onto a number of
opinions in recent years that make it harder for plaintiffs to obtain an
injunction and easier for defendants to seek modifications of injunctions that
ease the burden on defendants.94 His inadvertence appears to line up with his
values.
88

130 S. Ct. 2743, 2757 (2010).
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 26 (2011 Teachers’ Update).
90 See 130 S. Ct. at 2757 (“It is not enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to ask
whether there is a good reason why an injunction should not issue; rather, a court must determine that an
injunction should issue under the traditional four-factor test set out above.”).
91 See LAYCOCK, supra note 84, at 426–27.
92 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
93 LAYCOCK, supra note 89, at 4.
94 See, e.g., Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. 2743; see also Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593 (2009) (“The
party seeking relief bears the burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief, but once a party
carries this burden, a court abuses its discretion ‘when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in
light of such changes.’’’ (citation omitted) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997))); Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375–76 (2008) (“Issuing a preliminary injunction based only
89
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II. COMPARING THE WAYS JUSTICES MOVE THE LAW
Part I demonstrated that Justices have more ways to move the law besides
express and stealth overruling. I now turn to the question when Justices may
wish to use anticipatory overrulings, invitations, or time bombs. I put aside the
scenario in which a Justice decides to use the tool of inadvertence—itself a
logical impossibility.
Anticipatory overrulings can be aimed at either Congress or the public. By
giving advanced warning or suggestion as to what a Court is going to do in a
future case, the Court can give Congress (or another legislative body, in an
appropriate case) a chance to make a change in law to forestall overruling. In
the case of the VRA issue in NAMUDNO, for example, election law scholars
have read the Court’s decision as implicitly urging Congress to change aspects
of the Act so that the Court would not strike down the law as
unconstitutional.95
Justices might aim anticipatory overrulings at the public as well.
Elsewhere, I have contrasted the Court’s use of the constitutional-avoidance
doctrine in NAMUDNO with its use of an “anti-avoidance canon” to reach out
and decide the constitutional issue in Citizens United.96 One possible
explanation for the different treatment in the two cases is that the Court had
already given signals to the public before Citizens United in cases like WRTL II

on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such
relief.”).
95 See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Gerken: Can Congress Take a Hint?, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 23, 2009,
8:15 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013911.html (“The real worry for supporters of Section 5 is the
possibility that the Court’s liberals thought that sending a crystal clear, united message to Congress was
Section 5’s best hope. That is, the four Justices on the Court may have been as convinced as many
commentators are that Section 5 will fall when the case returns, and they were hoping that a unanimous
opinion would light a fire under Congress. To me, the fact that the four liberal Justices joined the opinion
represents a pretty big hint that Congress needs to act. The question is whether Congress can take the hint.”);
Richard H. Pildes, A Warning to Congress, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE BLOG (June 23, 2009, 11:30 AM),
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/the-battle-not-the-war-on-voting-rights/#richard
(“Congress might conclude that it would be wise to update the act rather than remaining silent and leaving the
next word to an obviously skeptical court.”). For an alternative reading of NAMUDNO as the product of
strategic compromise among conservative and liberal justices, see Joshua A. Douglas, The Voting Rights Act
Through the Justices’ Eyes: NAMUDNO and Beyond, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 19–23 (2009),
http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasLRevSeeAlso1.pdf.
96 See Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 4 (concluding that the different use of the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance in the two cases is the result of selective employment of the doctrine).
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that it was poised to strike down corporate-spending limits.97 In contrast, the
Court had not sent any signals to the public that the VRA was in danger of
being struck down. Although I flagged that possibility as far back as 2005,98
the issue was really not on the public’s radar screen until NAMUDNO. If the
Court comes back in a later case and strikes down the VRA, NAMUDNO
would have served as a warning to the public, and perhaps the warning,
coupled with congressional inaction after the warning, could serve to blunt
public criticism of the Court that could follow after such a controversial ruling.
Invitations to litigants, such as the invitations issued by Justice Alito, may
signal to a litigant that now is a good time to ask for the overturning of
precedent. Although the Court cannot pick which cases come up for possible
review, invitations to litigants may make it more likely for a Justice to shape
the Court’s docket. This may be especially true in challenges to federal
campaign-finance laws, which, thanks to special jurisdictional provisions,
often come to the Court on direct appeal, making it more likely that the Court
will hear the case on the merits.
It is also no coincidence that Justice Ginsburg, a frequent liberal dissenter
in 5–4 cases on a conservative Court, is inviting Congress to overturn the
Court in statutory cases (rather than inviting litigants to bring more cases).
Justice Ginsburg is less likely than Justice Alito to get her preferences
approved by the current Supreme Court, and so it is unsurprising that she is
signaling Congress when there is an especially worthy Court statutory decision
for Congress to consider overruling.
Time bombs, because of their subtlety, work differently. They are aimed at
stacking the deck, or boxing in the Justices, in future cases in which related
issues arise. They are meant to be subtle enough to avoid attracting the
attention of other Justices who may disagree with the future use of the
language included in the Court’s opinion. That the Supreme Court in the
Bennett case ultimately relied upon the oblique citation of Day in Davis as
authority for reversing the Ninth Circuit is some evidence that Justice Alito’s
potential time bomb paid off. Time bombs also may serve to diffuse public
opposition to controversial rulings. A ruling that appears to follow from earlier
precedent, as opposed to breaking from precedent, is apt to be less
97 Hasen, supra note 37, at 1069 (“However, the Court dropped an important footnote suggesting
corporate spending limits in candidate elections might be permissible to prevent corruption of candidates.”).
98 See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting
Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (2005).
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controversial. This is true even if the Court is merely following dicta or an offhanded comment in an earlier case. But time bombs have a disadvantage: they
are easier to ignore or dismiss than the more direct means of influencing how
the Court decides cases.
All of these tools send signals to the lower courts. While lower courts do
not have authority to ignore binding Supreme Court authority, lower courts can
interpret cases in ways that are equivalent to overruling or use procedural
devices, such as standing, to reach results in line with what the judges predict
to be current Supreme Court majority preference.99
The following chart demonstrates the audience, as well as the potential
costs and benefits, for the various tools by which Justices seek to move the
law.

99 On this point, see Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891 (2010).
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Tool
Express
overruling or
extension of
precedent
Stealth overruling

Primary Audience
Future Supreme Court,
lower courts,
Congress, litigants,
and the public
Lower courts and
litigants

Anticipatory
overruling

Congress and the
public

Invitation (to
litigants)

Litigants

Invitation (to
Congress)

Congress

Time Bomb

Future Supreme Court
and possibly lower
courts

Less direct than
express, stealth, or
anticipatory
overruling; and could
be ignored by a future
Court

Inadvertence

Future Supreme Court
and lower courts

Not an express tool
(occurs by accident)
and can move the law
in unintended ways

[Vol. 61:779

Costs
Potential public and
scholarly criticism

Benefits
Clear change in law
binding on all
parties

Greater uncertainty
than express
overruling and
criticism that the
Court is hiding its
actions
Leaves law in place
that is at odds with
the Court’s majority
preferences and
creates greater
uncertainty than
express or stealth
overruling
Less direct than
express, stealth, or
anticipatory
overruling; and
leaves the law in
place
Puts matters in the
hands of Congress,
not the Court, and is
less direct than other
tools

Changes law
without incurring
public criticism

Can avoid
confrontation with
political branches
and the public, and
can prepare the
public for an
eventual change in
law
Helps shape issues
on the Court’s
docket and
influences the
direction of the law
Provides an
additional way for a
Justice in the
minority on the
Court to direct
change in law
Can “fly under the
radar” and affect
changes in law over
the long term, and
can bind other
Justices without
requiring actual
agreement on
substance
Can “fly under the
radar” and affect
changes in law over
the long term, and
can bind other
Justices without
requiring actual
agreement on
substance
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CONCLUSION
Supreme Court Justices have more tools at their disposal to change the law
than first appears. Beyond express overruling or extension of precedent, and
even beyond stealth overruling, Justices can move the law in many ways,
including through anticipatory overrulings, invitations, time bombs, and
inadvertence. But the various tools for moving the law come with their own
costs and benefits, and are aimed at different audiences. Not all tools are
appropriate in each circumstance.
Perhaps the most significant part of this analysis is the demonstration that
the Court can move the law even when Justices do not intend to do so. The
eBay example shows the importance for lawyers and law professors to keep up
on cases in their fields and to offer amicus help aimed solely at assisting the
Court in avoiding inadvertent major changes in the law. Whatever one thinks
of the various devices Justices may use to move the law, the law should move
only when the Justices want the law to move.100

100 As this Article went to press, two new Supreme Court actions once again demonstrated the tools that
Justices may use to move the law. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a case concerning corporate
liability under the Alien Tort Statute, the Court issued an order a few days after oral argument asking for the
parties to brief a broader question about the extraterritorial reach of the statute. 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012); see
also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Seeks Clarification on Jurisdiction in a Human Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2012, at A15. I suggested that this reargument order is consistent with Justice Alito’s views, explained
in this Article, that precedent should not be overturned or expanded without full briefing or argument. Rick
Hasen, Fingerprints of Justice Alito All over Kiobel Reargument Order: Citizens United Déjà Vu, ELECTION L.
BLOG (Mar. 6, 2012, 7:57 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=31067.
In American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, the Supreme Court temporarily stayed a Montana
Supreme Court decision that held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United did not prevent
Montana from enacting a ban on corporate spending in candidate elections. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock,
132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012). The order was to last until the Court acted on a petition for writ of certiorari in the
case. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, issued the following statement with respect to the granting of
the stay:

Montana’s experience, and experience elsewhere since this Court’s decision in Citizens United v.
FEC, make it exceedingly difficult to maintain that independent expenditures by corporations ‘do
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.’ A petition for writ of certiorari will
give the Court an opportunity to consider whether, in light of the huge sums currently deployed
to buy candidates’ allegiance, Citizens United should continue to hold sway. Because lower
courts are bound to follow this Court’s decision until they are withdrawn or modified, however, I
vote to grant the stay.
Id. at 1307–08.
Court watcher Tom Goldstein viewed Justice Ginsburg’s statement as an invitation for amici to file
briefs at the certiorari stage of the case. Tom Goldstein, The Supreme Court, Citizens United II, and the
November Election [Updated], SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2012, 8:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/
the-supreme-court-citizens-united-ii-and-the-november-election/. I viewed this statement as Justice Ginsburg
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signaling her opportunity to “speak truth to power.” Richard L. Hasen, Occupy the Super PACs, SLATE (Feb.
20, 2012, 7:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/02/justice_ruth_bader_
ginsburg_is_ready_to_speak_out_on_the_danger_of_super_pacs_.html. At the end of the Supreme Court’s
Term, the Court summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court, with Justice Breyer writing a dissent for
himself and Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor arguing that the Court should have taken the case to
reconsider Citizens United. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 80 U.S.L.W. 3701 (2012) (per curiam).

